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In this paper we estimate a model of household labor supply based on the collective
approach developed by Chiappori (JPE, 1992). This approach assumes that the intra-
household decision process leads to Pareto efﬁcient outcomes. Our model extends this
theory by allowing the marriage market, and especially the sex ratio, to affect the sharing
rule and the household labor supplies. We show that our model imposes new restrictions
on the parameters of the labor supply functions. Also, individual preferences and the
sharing rule are recovered using an identiﬁcation procedure that is both simpler and more
robust than in Chiappori’s initial approach. The model is estimated using PSID data for
the year 1988. Our results do not reject the restrictions imposed by the model. Moreover,
the sex ratio inﬂuences the sharing rule and the labor supply behavior in the directions
predicted by the theory. Finally, the impact of individual wage rates suggests that spouses
behave in an altruistic manner within the household.
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Traditionally, household demand and labor supply decisions have been modeled as though
household members were maximizing a unique, well behaved, utility function. Recent dissat-
isfaction with this “unitary” model arose in a large part from the weakness of its theoretical
foundations [Chiappori (1992)] and its inability to be used to perform intra-household welfare
analysis [Apps and Rees (1988)] or to study decisions such as marriage or divorce [Lundberg
(1988)]1. Since the standard unitary model considers the household as the basic unit of de-
cision, it is generally not possible to recover individual preferences or the parameters of the
internal decision process that determines the distribution of utilities and observed outcomes.
Alternative models have recently challenged the unitary model and attempted to incorpo-
rate different individual preferences and a model of intra-household decision making process.
In particular, the Nash bargaining model assumes that a household maximizes the product of
each member’s utility in excess of a reservation level reﬂecting either marriage dissolution
[e.g., Manser and Brown (1980), McElroy and Horney (1981)] or an “uncooperative” mar-
riage [e.g., Lundberg and Pollak (1993)]. A collective model of household labor supply has
also been developed by Chiappori [(1988), (1992)]. He assumes that household decisions are
Pareto efﬁcient but abstracts from the details of the bargaining process. In its most general
form, the collective model nests Nash bargaining models as particular cases, since the latter
are based on axioms that include Pareto efﬁciency. It also nests uncooperative repeated game
models as long as they lead to Pareto efﬁcient outcomes [see Lundberg and Pollak (1994) and
Bergstrom (1997) for a discussion].
Acrucialissueconcernsthedesignofempiricaltestsoftheseunitaryandnon-unitarytheo-
ries. One important implication of the unitary model is pooling: only total exogenous income,
not its distribution across household members, plays a role in the decision process. Using
various measures of income, many studies attempted to test this income pooling hypothesis
[e.g., Schultz (1990), Thomas (1990), Phipps and Burton (1994)]. In all these studies, income
pooling is strongly rejected. However, these tests raise two issues. First, while the results
reject the unitary model, they cannot be interpreted as supporting any alternative approach in
particular since many models could rationalize such results. In order to empirically support
a speciﬁc model, one must derive, from this setting, restrictions that can potentially be, but
are actually not, falsiﬁed by empirical observations. Recent work has attempted to derive and
provide empirical tests of the collectiveapproach [see Bourguignon et al. (1993), Browning et
al. (1994), Udry (1996), Browning and Chiappori (1997)]. Browning, Lechene and Rasheed
1An obvious exception is Becker’s (1991) approach, where the household is explicitly modeled as a two-
person decision unit, although its behavior can be still analyzed with the tools of standard consumer theory.
1(1996) have tested different non-unitary models within a structural framework. However, they
assume that labor supply is ﬁxed, which may lead to speciﬁcation problems. Moreover, in-
dividual preferences over consumption and leisure cannot be recovered. Fortin and Lacroix
(1997) have provided an analysis that allows labor supply to vary. They found that while the
restrictions of the unitary model are rejected, the collective restrictions are not. More recently,
Blundell et al. (1998) investigate labor participation decisions within a collective context, al-
lowing for unobservable heterogeneity. In both cases, however, the intra-household decision
process is not very precisely estimated.
The second issue concerns the use of individual incomes in the design of the tests. In most
studies, the distribution of household (total or nonlabor) income plays an important role in the
derivation of tests. However this variable is particularly prone to reporting and measurement
errors which may severely bias econometric tests [Chiappori et al. (1993), Lundberg and
Pollak (1996)]. The endogeneity of earnings is likely to be a serious problem as well. Finally,
one must also expect nonlabor income to be correlated with some unobservable individual
characteristics that inﬂuence consumption and labor supply [Behrman, Pollak and Taubman
(1995)]. For instance, variations in property income may reﬂect past saving and therefore
unobserved (past and current) productivity heterogeneity2.
It should however be emphasized that individual incomes are not needed to perform tests
of this kind. A more general idea is to use distribution factors [Bourguignon, Browning and
Chiappori (1995)], that is, variables that can affect the decision process without inﬂuencing
preferences or the joint consumption set. Typically, distribution factors include not only in-
dividual income variables, but also “extra-environmental parameters” (EEPs) in McElroy’s
(1990) terminology. EEPs affect opportunities of spouses outside marriage and can therefore
inﬂuence respective bargaining power and the ﬁnal allocation. Like individual income vari-
ables, EEPs should have no effect on behavior in the unitary framework while the collective
approach may impose restrictions as to how they inﬂuence outcomes. Moreover, EEPs play
a role in some cooperative models while they play none in others. Thus outside opportuni-
ties can inﬂuence behavior in the Manser-Brown/McElroy-Horney divorce threat bargaining
model, while they will have no effect in the Lundberg-Pollak “separate spheres” bargaining
model. In this case, the fall-back option is not divorce but an uncooperative marriage in which
spouses “revert to a division of work based on socially recognized and sanctioned gender
roles”.3 In short, distribution factors (or EEPs) represent a means of providing additional tests
2One way to avoid these problems is to exploit “natural” experiments involving exogenous reallocation in
intra-household incomes. Thus Lundberg, Pollak and Wales (1997) present a test of pooling based on a policy
change in the United Kingdom that transferred child allowances from husbands to wives in the late 1970’s.
Unfortunately such natural experiments are very scarce.
3Lundberg and Pollak (1993) develop a modiﬁed version of this model which allows for binding prenuptial
2of the unitary and the collective models, and of discriminating between some non-unitary
approaches.
Variables that proxy the situation in the marriage market are natural candidates for EEPs.
This intuition can be traced back to Becker (1991, ch.3), who emphasized that the marriage
market is an important determinant of intra-household utility distribution. In his approach, the
state of the marriage market crucially depends on the sex ratio, that is, the relative supplies
of males and females in the marriage market.4 A nice theoretical foundation of this view has
been provided by Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985), who consider a non cooperative repeated
game model of transactions between pairs of agents who meet randomly and bargain if they
meet. Viewed as a model of marriage, it predicts that, following an increase in the number
of males relative to females, males will be willing to concede a larger share of the gains
from a marriage contract with a female [Bergstrom (1997)]. Grossbard-Shechtman(1993) has
developed a simple general equilibrium model of the interactions between marriage and labor
markets in which the sex ratio inﬂuences marital and labor supply decisions. At the empirical
level, using time series and cross-section data, she found that an increase in the sex ratio
reduces the labor force participation of married women in the U.S. However her econometric
approach is not explicitly grounded in a structural model and uses aggregate data, which may
create serious econometric problems for empirical testing.
The aim of the present paper is to theoretically analyze and empirically estimate the ef-
fects of distribution factors in the context of a structural, micro-economic model of household
behavior. The underlying model is Chiappori’s (1992) collective model of labor supply, where
leisure and consumption are privately consumed within the household. Efﬁciency has, in this
setting, a very simple interpretation : household decisions can be modeled as a two-step pro-
cess, where individuals ﬁrst share their total nonlabor income according to some sharing rule,
then maximize their own utilities subject to separate budget constraints. In particular, the
intra-household decision process can be fully summarized by the sharing rule. We ﬁrst inves-
tigate the theoretical consequences of the introduction of a distribution factor. The latter, by
deﬁnition, only inﬂuences behavior through its effect upon the sharing rule. We show that this
fact generates new testable restrictions. Also, as in Chiappori’s initial model, it is possible to
recover the parameters of individual preferences (up to a translation) and of the sharing rule
(up to an additive constant) from the sole observation of labor supply. We show, however,
that the new context allows for a different identiﬁcation procedure, that is both simpler and
agreements on a minimal transfer from one spouse to the other. This model could allow EEPs to inﬂuence
distribution within marriage in the long run by inﬂuencing the value of this transfer in new marriages.
4Lundberg and Pollak (1996) insist on the speciﬁc features of the marriage contract (e.g., whether marriage
agreements are binding or not) as another determinant of the marriage market. Unfortunately, it is difﬁcult to
construct empirical measures of these features.
3more robust than before. In particular, it only relies upon ﬁrst order derivativesof labor supply
functions, whereas second order derivatives were required in the initial framework.
We then estimate and test this collective model using 1988 PSID data for couples in which
both spouses are working. The distribution factor we use is the sex ratio by age, race and
location. For estimation purposes, we use a full information Generalized Method of Moments
(GMM) applied to a two-equation system with endogenous explanatory variables. We ﬁnd
that the effect of the sex ratio upon labor supply is signiﬁcant, and that it satisﬁes the testable
restrictions implied by the collective model. Hence, not only does the sex ratio inﬂuence
behavior, but it does so in exactly the way predicted by the theory. Other things equal, an
increase in the proportion of men lowers female labor supply while it increases male labor
supply. Empirically, it is found that a one percentage point increase in the sex ratio raises
transfers from husbands to their wife by around $2,500 a year. Even more interesting is the
fact that no effect of the sex ratio on singles’ labor supply can be observed; this indicates that,
although the sex ratio may partly reﬂect conditions on the labor market, it probably is not the
whole story.
The other parameters of the sharing rule are also recovered. For instance, we ﬁnd that a
one dollar increase in male (resp. female) hourly wage - which, given the average number
of hours per year, represents an average additional yearly income above $2,200 (resp. above
$1,700) - increases (resp. decreases) the female share of nonlabor income by $600 (resp.
$900). Similarly, one dollar increase in household nonlabor income will increase the wife’s
income by 55 cents.
Section 2 presents our theoretical framework. Section 3 discusses the choice of the empir-
ical speciﬁcation adopted for estimating and testing purposes. Section 4 provides an analysis
of our econometric strategy. Data and empirical results are discussed in Section 5. Our con-
clusions are presented in Section 6.
2 The Model
2.1 The basic setting
In this section, we develop a collective labor supply model which extends Chiappori’s (1992)
approach to take into account distribution factors. In this framework, the household consists
of two individuals with distinct utility functions and the decision process, whatever its true
nature, leads to Pareto-efﬁcient outcomes. This assumption seems quite natural, given that
4spouses usually know each other’s preferences pretty well (at least, after a certain period of
time) and interact very often. Therefore, they are unlikelyto leave Pareto-improving decisions







￿ denote respectively member




















￿ . Household members have egoistic preferences5 represented by strictly quasi-concave




























  vector of preference factors, such as age and education of the two agents, number and age
of children, etc. For convenience, the vector












  vector of distribution factors.










































































































































































































4 is assumedcontinuously differentiablein its arguments. It should thus be
clear that the particular location of the solution on the Pareto frontier depends on all relevant



















. . Furthermore, since the vector
of distribution factors,
. , appears only in
4 , a change in
. does not affect the Pareto frontier
but only the ﬁnal location on it. In the particular case where
4 is assumed to be constant,
the collective framework corresponds to the unitary model. In this situation, the distribution
factors have no effect on behavior.
As far as efﬁciency is concerned, there is basically no restriction upon the form of the
function
4 . However, for the estimation process, we shall assume that
4 is monotonic. A nat-
ural interpretation is that, in line with, say, a bargaining interpretation of the decision process,
5As shown below, the model also holds in the more general case of “caring’ preferences [see Becker (1991)].
5any distribution factor that is positively (resp. negatively) correlated with member 1’s (resp.
2’s) threat point should increase
4 .
Now, it is well known from the second fundamental welfare theorem that any Pareto op-
timum can be decentralized in an economy of this kind [see Chiappori (1992)]. Speciﬁcally,
we have the following result:




















































































































Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the second welfare theorem.
The interpretation is that the decision process can always be consideredas a two stage pro-
cess : ﬁrst, nonlabor income is allocated between household members and then, each member
separately chooses labor supply (and private consumption), subject to the corresponding bud-
get constraint. The function
e
is called the sharing rule; it describes the way nonlabor income
is divided up, as a function of wages, nonlabor income, distribution factors and other observ-
able characteristics.6
2.2 Restrictions on Labor Supplies and the Sharing Rule
The collective framework imposes certain restrictions on the labor supply functions. To ana-































































6In the presence of household public goods, a sharing rule can be deﬁned but conditionally on the level of
these public goods.









































































































￿ is the Marshallian labor supply associated with
￿
￿ .
The particular structure of equations (3) and (4) imposes testable restrictions on labor
supply behavior; also, it allows the recovery of the partials of the sharing rule. The intuition
goes as follows. Consider a change in, say, member
￿ ’s wage rate. This can only have an
income effect on his or her spouse’s behavior through its effect on the sharing rule, just as
distribution factors and nonlabor income. Thus, the impact of these variables on labor supply





as well as between
. and
- in the sharing rule; technically,it generatestwo equationsinvolving
the corresponding partials of the sharing rule. The same argument applies to member 2’s
behavior, which leads to two other equations. These four equations allow to directly identify
the four partials of the sharing rule. Finally, cross-derivative constraints on the sharing rule
imposes restrictions to the model that can be tested.




















































































/ . Note that all these
variables are observable and can thus be estimated. The following results hold:






















￿ has been removed to simplify the notation), the following conditionsare necessary



























































































































































































































































































’ hold and for a given
& , the sharing rule is deﬁned







’ depending only on the preference factors
& . The partial
derivatives of the sharing rule with respect to wages, nonlabor income and the distribu-




























































/ ), an additional set of














































’ are analogous to Slutsky restrictions in the (general) sense that they
providea set ofpartialdifferentialequationsandinequalitiesthatmust besatisﬁed bythelabor
supply equations (1) and (2) in order to be consistent with the collective model. Note, how-
ever, that their form is quite different from those obtained in Chiappori (1992) for a similar
model without distribution factors. As a matter of fact, the introduction of distribution factors
deeply changes the way the model is identiﬁed. In Chiappori’s initial contribution, identiﬁ-
cation required second order derivatives. In our case, to the contrary, ﬁrst order derivatives
are enough. This suggests that the kind of identiﬁcation that may obtain is more robust in this
case. Note, however, that an alternative approach using second derivatives can still be used










￿ ). This can be shown to generate identical
results; intuitively, the second order conditions in Chiappori (1992) are direct consequences
of the restrictions in Proposition 2.
Interestingly, the model implies that the relative effects of distribution factors on each





































/ , since both members of this







H .7 These latter restrictions are very general in the sense that they
can be shownto hold also when public goods and externalities are incorporated into the model
[see Bourguignon, Browning and Chiappori (1995)]. The basic reason is that distribution
factors affect consumption and labor supply choices only through the location chosen on the
Pareto frontier, or equivalently, through the implicit weighting of each spouse’s utility. Since
this weighting is unidimensional, this implies that the ratio of the impacts of all distribution
factors on the two labor supplies are equal. It is worth stressing that these restrictions appear
only when there are at least two distribution factors.


























ƒ , and since,

































































Up to now, we have assumed that preferences are egotistic. However, as shown in Chiappori
(1992), all the previous results also hold in the more general case of “caring” agents [see
Becker (1991)], that is, whose preferences are represented by a utility function that depends
onbothhisorher egotisticutilityandhisorherspouse’s. Formally,member
￿ ’s utilityfunction






































































functions impose separability between a member’s own private goods and his or her spouse’s.
It is clear that any decision that is Pareto efﬁcient under caring would also be Pareto efﬁcient,
were the agents egotistic. Assume not; then it would be possible to increase the egotistic
utility of a member without decreasing the utility of the other. But this would increase the
caring utility of at least one member without reducing the caring utility of any member, a
contradiction. In fact, the Pareto frontier of caring agents is a subset of the Pareto frontier
derived by assuming that they are egotistic [Chiappori (1992)]. In section 3, we will use these
results to derive the parametric restrictions imposed by the collective model to the particular
laborsupplysystemconsideredin oureconometricapproach,andto recoverthecorresponding
sharing rule.
2.4 Sex ratio and labor supply: alternative explanations
As mentioned in the introduction, the empirical work below applies the previous results on a
speciﬁc data set, using the sex ratio (by age, race and state) as a distribution factor. In this
particular case, additional predictions can be made about the impact of the distribution factor
on household behavior. We expect, following Becker’s arguments, that the scarcity of one
particular sex on the marriage market will beneﬁt to individuals of this sex. Typically, the
latter will be able to attract a larger share of household income, a fact that should be reﬂected
in the structure of the sharing rule and of the resulting behavior; for instance, if leisure is a
normal good, then corresponding labor supply should decrease, whereas it should increase for
the the other sex. An important test of our model hence relies on the effect of the sex ratio on
labor supply.
While marriage market and non-unitary models provide natural explanations for the cor-
relation between sex ratio and labor supply behavior, these are by no means exclusive. For
instance, spatial variations in the sex ratio could be related to labor markets considerations
10[Grossbard-Shechtman(1993)]. One interpretation is that in States where one observes a rela-
tive scarcity of men (due to some exogenous determinants), the demand for their services will
be stronger and therefore they will tend to work longer hours than elsewhere. The contrary
will be observed for women. Note, however, that, compared to the collective explanation,
this argument leads to exactly opposite predictions: male labor supply should decrease with
sex ratio (deﬁned as the percentage of males in the population under consideration), whereas
the collective model suggests an increase. Hence, the two theories have opposite empirical
predictions, which suggests that data should allow to decide.
A second explanation involves demand for labor. Assume that some States specialize in
“male” sectors, i.e., sectors with a stronger relative demand for male labor supply. These
States will attract relatively more men through migration. Therefore, they will have high (and
endogenous) sex ratios and presumably high male hours of work; whereas female hours of
work, on the other hand, may well be below the national average in these states. Conversely,
States that concentrate in “female” sectors will have low sex ratios and high female hours of
work. Note that this effect, in contrast with the previous, goes in the same direction as the
“collective” explanation. The empirical distinction between them is thus less straightforward,
but still not out of reach. First, as long as the labor demand effects inﬂuence hours of work
throughthewagerates,theyaretakenintoaccountinourmodelsincewecontrolforindividual
wage rates. However, they could also affect unobserved variables that inﬂuence hours of work
such as labor market rationing, nonlabor income, etc.
Anotherwaytodiscriminatebetweenthemarriagemarketandthelabormarkethypotheses
is to analyze the impact of the sex ratio on the labor supply of singles. According to the
marriage market hypothesis, the sex ratio should have no effect on their labor supply (at least
if one ignores its impact on transfers to potential spouses). In contrast, under the labor market
hypothesis, the sex ratio should inﬂuence the labor supply of both singles and couples. This
suggests a simple and rather strong test that would allow to discriminate between the two
explanations.
Finally, it should be stressed that the collective model provides strong restrictions upon
how distribution factors may affect behavior. Speciﬁcally, the conditions in Proposition 2
relate the effect of the sex ratio to that of wages and nonlabor income. While these conditions
are direct consequences of the collective setting, they have no reason to hold whenever the
effectunderconsiderationstemsfromlabormarketmechanisms. Consequently,theyprovidea
distinctandadditionalmeansoftestingthecollectiveexplanation. Thesetestswillbecarefully
considered in the empirical sections.
113 Parametric Speciﬁcation of the Model
3.1 Functional form of labor supplies
In order to estimate and test a collective model of labor supply, we must ﬁrst specify a func-
tional form for individual labor supply functions. Let us consider the following unrestricted

















































































































































































































˚ , are scalar, and the
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  vectors of parameters.
The generalized semi-log system (6) and (7) satisﬁes a number of desirable properties.
First, in its unrestricted form, it does not impose all the (equality) conditions of the collective
model. Therefore, the latter yields a set of restrictions that can be empirically tested. Second,
as shown below, these restrictions do not impose unrealistic constraints on behavior. Third,
assuming that the collective restrictions are satisﬁed, it is possible to recover a closed form







’ ) and for the pair of individual indirect







’ ). Finally, the fact that equations (6) and ( 7) are linear in
parameters eases the estimation.
Of course, this generalizedsemi-logsystem also has some limitations. Whilesome restric-
tions of the unitary model consistent with this system do not impose unrealistic labor supply
behavior, other restrictions do and therefore cannot be tested.8 However, this should not be a
serious problem since the unitary model of household labor supply has been rejected in many
8More speciﬁcally, the unitary model imposes that labor supplies are independentfrom any distributionfactor






























￿ , for all
￿ . These restrictions can be tested. However, the





























































































￿ , for all
￿ , which implies that labor
12studies [e.g., Kooreman and Kapteyn (1986), Lundberg (1988), Fortin and Lacroix (1997)].
Second, labor supply curves are either everywhere upward sloping or everywhere backward





















’ .9 Note, however,
that the log form for the wage rates is likely to reﬂect more realistic behavior than the linear
form that is frequently used in empirical studies [e.g., Hausman (1981)]. Thus it allows the
effect of the wage rate on labor supply to decrease with the level of hours of work (when the
labor supply is upward sloping), which is likely to be the case. It is also worth mentioning that
our speciﬁcation allows for interactions between distribution and preferences factors.
The restrictions imposed by the collective model (see Proposition 2) to the generalized












































































































































It should be stressed that, according to the collective model, these equations cannot be






represents the ratio of income effects on labor
supplies; the latter is positiveas long as leisure is a normal good for both members and that an
increasein







of distribution factor effects; since, by deﬁnition, a distribution factor affects the husband’s
and the wife’s share of non labor income in opposite direction, the ratio must be negative
















































Since this condition must hold for any

















































, or, equivalently (assuming that no parameter is equal to zero):
supplies are the same and depend only on nonlabor income and on preference factors. It is clear that these two
cases impose severe constraints on behavior.
9Using our data set, we test for nonmonotonicity of the effect of own wage rates by introducing the square of





































Equations (8) impose testable cross-equation restrictions in our labor supply system. They


















+ to be equal to the
corresponding ratio of the marginal effects of the distribution factor on labor supplies. These
restrictions stem from the fact that the cross term and the distribution factor enter labor supply
functions only through the same function
e
(the sharing rule). It should be stressed that the
collective model imposes no (equality) restriction when there is no distribution factor or no





















If the restrictions (8) are satisﬁed, the partials of
e


























































































































































































































































’ is not identiﬁable, since the variable
& affects both the
sharing rule and the preferences. This reﬂects the fact that, for any given
& , the sharing rule
can be recovered up to an additive constant for each individual.
143.3 Individual labor supplies
It is also possible to recover the individual labor supply functions associated with this setting.
Since they must have a functional form consistent with the system (3) and (4), it is clear, using

























































































’ as applied to our particular speciﬁcation, and using the partials of
e
given by








































































































’ in equation (10), which is not identiﬁable10.
Slutsky conditions on compensated individual labor supplies [see (
￿ ) and (
￿ ) in Proposi-













































These conditions are checked for each observation,in the empirical section. Global conditions

























3.4 Indirect utility functions
It can be shown [Stern (1986)] that the indirect utility functions consistent with the labor








































































































10Identiﬁcation of these functions would require additional identifying restrictions. For instance, it obtains
whenrever a variable in


























































































It is easy to show that Roy’s identity applied to each of these indirect utility functions yields
the individual labor supply system (11) and (12). These functions can be used to perform
intra-household welfare analysis of changes in exogenous variables.
4 Econometric Issues
It is natural to estimate the restricted and unrestricted versions of the labor supply system
(6) and (7) using an instrumental variable (IV) approach, given that the wage rates, nonlabor
income and fertility variables are potentially endogenous [see Mroz (1987)]. However, to
improve the efﬁciency of our estimator, we take into account the correlation between the
error terms in husbands’ and wives’ labor supply equations. For this purpose, we rely on
full information GMM method. One advantage of this approach is that it also takes into
account heteroskedasticity of unknown form in the errors, which can not be done using a
full information maximum likelihood method [see Davidson and MacKinnon (1993), p.660].
Therefore, in the presence of heteroskedasticity of unknown form, our estimator should be
more efﬁcient, asymptotically, than 3SLS or FIML.11



























































are respectively the be satisﬁed. Given our parametric speciﬁ-
cation and household
￿ female and male labor supply, the
￿
7
￿ ’s are the vectors of parameters to
11In the unrestricted version of our model, our estimator is identical to the heteroskedastic three-stage least
squares (H3SLS) estimator since the model is linear in parameters. This is not the case in the restricted version
of the model though, since the restrictions on the parameters are nonlinear.
12Conditioning the sample on working spouses may induce a selectivity bias especially in the case of females.
We ignore this bias in the analysis. The basic reason is that such a correction requires an extension of the col-
lective model to corner solutions, a task that is beyond the scope of this paper. The reader is referred to Blundell
et al (1998) for an investigation of the related (but different) problem of discrete labor supply decisions.There is
some evidence that the selectivity bias is not likely to be a problem though. For instance, using PSID data, and
based on a standard recursive labor supply model, Mroz (1987) could not reject the hypothesis of no selectivity













￿ are the vectors of explanatory variables, some of which are
potentially endogenous and the
4
￿
￿ ’s are the error terms whose expected value is zero. These










































, as the stacked vector of error terms. Assume


















































’ , when there are more moment conditions than there are parameters to estimate,












































































￿ , are diagonal with typical element












’ . The sub-matrices
￿
￿
￿ are not observable. However, they can be



















































’ , where the estimated parameters
are obtained in a ﬁrst step using a consistent, albeit inefﬁcient, IV estimation.
Following an iteration process suggested by Mackinnon and Davidson (1993), equation
(15) is ﬁrst minimized starting with
￿
￿
￿ ; next we compute
￿
￿
and minimize (15) again.
Upon convergence, we compute
￿
￿
with the new set of parameter estimates and minimize
again (15). We iterate until the log of the determinant of
￿
￿
converges to a stable value. The
asymptotic covariance matrix of
￿



























5 Data and empirical results
5.1 Data
The data we use in this study come from the University of Michigan Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) for the year 1988 (interview year 1989). Our “full” sample consists of 1618
17households in which both spouses have positive hours of work and are between 30 and 60
years of age. This latter restriction was used in order to eliminate as much as possible full-
time studentsand retiredindividuals,and to reducecohorteffects. Removingcouplesin which
spouses are aged less than 30 increases the proportion of “stable” households, for which the
hypothesis of efﬁciency in the intra-household decision process is more likely to be satisﬁed.
We also present estimation results based on a restricted sample of households with no pre-
school (under 6) children, in order to minimize the extent of nonseparable public goods within
the household (the best example of which being expenditures on young children) which may
inﬂuence the validity of the restrictions imposed by our collective model.13
The dependent variables, male and female annual hours of work, are deﬁned as total hours
of work on all jobs during 1988. The measure of the wage rate is the average hourly earn-
ings, deﬁned by dividing total labor income over annual hours of work. Nonlabor income
includes, among other things, imputed income (with a nominal interest rate of 12%14) from
all household net assets and is net of total household savings.15 This variable is treated as an
endogenous variable in the empirical section. It should be stressed that the PSID provides in-
formation on net assets at the beginning of periods 1984 and 1989. Therefore our measure of
savings is the annual average change in total net household assets over this period (expressed
in 1988 dollars). In order to reduce measurement errors on this variable, we further restricted
our sample to households with stable couples over the 1984-1989 period.
Our sex-ratioindexis computedatthe Statelevelusing datafrom theCensus ofPopulation
and Housing of 1990. It correspondsto the number of males that are of the same age and same
race as the husband of each household over the number of males and females that are of the
same race and age group.16
13Lundberg (1988) has provided evidence that the interaction in the allocation of time between wives and
husbands is strongly affected by the presence of pre-school children. Sample size considerations prevented us
from focusing on households with no children.
14We also experimented with nominal interest rates of 8% and 10% but this did not signiﬁcantly affect the
results.
15Removing household savings from the measure of nonlabor income is consistent with an inter-temporally
separable life-cycle model involving a two stage budgeting process. In the ﬁrst stage, the couple optimally al-
locates life-cycle wealth over each period in order to determine the vector of period-speciﬁc levels of nonlabor
income net of savings. At each period, nonlabor income net of savings plus total household wage income is
equal to the level of household consumption expenditures (this represents period-speciﬁc household budget con-
straints). The second stage corresponds to period-speciﬁc Pareto efﬁcient allocations of goods and labor supplies
[see Blundell and Walker (1986) for a discussion of a life-cycle two stage budgeting process in the case of a
one-individual household].
16We experimented with various deﬁnitions of the sex-ratio: means of sex-ratios using the number of females
who are two years younger than the husband or based on individuals who are at most 2 or 5 years younger than
the husband of each household. The results were very robust to the deﬁnition used.
18Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for both full sample and the sub-sample of house-
holds with no preschool children. The upper panel concerns variables that are treated as en-
dogenous in the ensuing empirical analysis. The lower panel concerns exogenous variables.
Asexpected,menworkonaveragemoreyearlyhoursthanwomenandearnasomewhathigher
hourly wage rate. The next two lines report the average number of pre-schoolers (in the full
sample) and school age children per household. These two variables are treated as endoge-
nous in the empirical work. Although there is mixed evidence concerning the endogeneity of
number of children in women’s labor supply [see, e.g., Schultz (1980) and Mroz (1987)], we
deem preferable to instrument these variables.
Men are also slightly older than their spouse but they both have similar schooling, which
in turn is above that of their respective father. The distribution by race is identical among men
and women. A closer look at the data reveals that there are very few interracial marriages
in our sample. The sex ratio is thus computed on the assumption that the relevant marriage
market is limited to one’s own race. The next lines report the mean of the sex ratios for Whites
and Blacks. Although the means are relatively similar, the sex ratios for Blacks depict much
more variation. This increased variation is observable both state-wise and age-wise.
5.2 Empirical Results
The parametric form that is estimated was presented in equations (6) and (7). As mentioned
above, two speciﬁcations are considered for estimation purposes, one using the full sample
and the other limited to households with no pre-school children. Also, given the difﬁculty of
obtaining information on distribution factors, we consider only one of those, namely the sex
ratio.17 Moreover, no interaction terms with the sex ratio were found statistically signiﬁcant.
Therefore, estimation results presented in this section ignore these terms. Finally, preference
factors are the number of pre-school age children (in the ﬁrst speciﬁcation), the number of
schoolagechildren,education,age,dummyregionalvariablesandaracedummy(=1ifwhite).
This speciﬁcation is relativelystandard in the labor supply literature [e.g., Mroz (1987), Smith
Conway (1997)]. It must be stressed that the race dummy allows to deal with the correlation
between the sex ratio and labor supplies that could be due to a race effect (since the sex ratio
is smaller on average and has a larger variance in the case of black households)18.
17We did estimate the model by distinguishing between husband’s and wife’s nonlabor income to provide one
additional distribution factor. Unfortunately, the parameter estimates were never statistically signiﬁcant when
doing so. One basic difﬁculty lies in properly deﬁning and measuring each spouse’s nonlabor income.
18We also estimate the model separately for Blacks and Whites. The results are quite similar but less precise
than those reported in this sub-section.
19Before dwelling into the results, the issue of endogenous covariates must be addressed.
Indeed, unobserved individual characteristics may be positively correlated with wages and/or
nonlabor income and hours of work, thus creating spurious correlation between right hand-
side variables and the error terms of the hours equations. We thus follow Mroz (1987) and
use a second-order polynomial in age and education to instrument the wages, the nonlabor
income and the number of pre-schoolers (in the speciﬁcation using total sample) and school
age children.19 Other instrumentsinclude father education, religion and city size (3 dummies).
In the unrestricted version with total sample, there are 28 parameters to estimate and over 68
instruments (see Tables 2 and 3 for the complete list of instruments).
Table 2 provides estimation results using the full sample. Its ﬁrst two columns present the
parameter estimates of equations (6) and (7), respectively, i.e., the unrestricted version. No-
tice that all parameters are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, except, in women’s
equation, education, White dummy and two regional variables and, in men’s equation, chil-
dren dummies, White dummy and two regional variables. Hansen’s test does not reject the
validity of the instruments and the over-identifying restrictions. The test statistic of 25.1 is to



























mentioning. For instance, the parameter estimate associated with the sex ratio is negative
in women’s equation and positive in men’s equation. These results thus reject an important
restrictionoftheunitarymodelaccordingto whichnodistributionfactorinﬂuencesbehavior.20
It also rejectsthe simple versionof the “separatespheres”model whichassumes thatthe threat
point is not divorce but an uncooperative marriage.21
As discussed above, it can be argued that these tests are biased since the sex ratio is likely
to be correlated with unobserved variables; the observed effect might result, for instance,
from labor markets mechanisms. We suggested in Section 2 a convenient way to discriminate
betweenthemarriagemarketandthelabormarkethypotheses,namelytoanalyzetheimpactof
the sex ratio on the labor supply of singles: the latter should be zero according to the marriage
market hypothesis, whereas, in the labor market story, the sex ratio should inﬂuence the labor
19The estimated coefﬁcients of wages and nonlabor income are rather insensitive to the instrumentation of the
children variables. Therefore, restricting the sample to households with no pre-school children (as in our second
speciﬁcation) is not likely to generate severe selectivity biases.
20Of course, one could argue that this test is subject to a speciﬁcation problem since, as shown earlier, the
functional form considered for labor supplies imposes unrealistic behavior when all restrictions of the unitary
model are assumed.
21Theoretically, one could also test restrictionsof this model (or alternative bargaining models) that stem from
the particular formulation of the Nash bargaining program. However, these restrictions are likely to be very
difﬁcult to derive formally [see McElroy (1990) and Chiappori (1992) for a recent discussion].
20supply of both singles and couples in a similar way. Table 4 reports results from OLS and
GMM regressions as applied to (male and female) singles between 20 and 60 years of age22.
In both GMM estimations, Hansen’s test does not reject the validity of the instruments and
the over-identifying restrictions. We also ﬁnd that the impact of the sex ratio on singles’ labor
supply is never signiﬁcant at the 5% level. In the case of GMM estimation for women, it
is signiﬁcant at the 10% level, but the coefﬁcient is of the opposite sign to that of wives.
We conclude that although the sex ratio may partly reﬂect conditions on the labor market, it
probably is not the whole story.
Anotherpoint is that, shouldthesexratio reﬂectonly labormarket mechanisms,thereis no
reason to expect that the speciﬁc restrictions derived in Proposition 2 be satisﬁed. Given our








































). This simply states that the ratio



















+ and the sex ratio must be the same in both equations. To
assess the validity of the collective model, we report the parameter estimates of the restricted
model in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2. Newey-West’s test does not reject the validity of the






































This provides support for the theoretical approach we used to derive the restrictions of the
collectivemodel. Also, Slutsky conditions on the labor supply of women are globally satisﬁed
while they are locally satisﬁed for all men in the sample.
Column (5) of the table reports the implicit parameters of women’s sharing rule as derived
from the restricted parameters of columns (3) and (4) and using equation (10). All parameter
estimates of the sharing rule are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels. In order to gain
insight into the interpretation of the parameters of the sharing rule, Table 5 reports, for the
full sample, the partial derivatives of the sharing along with their standard errors. The ﬁrst
column of the table replicates last column of Table 2. The second column reports the partial
derivatives themselves. These partial derivatives represent the impact of a marginal change
in one variable on the nonlabor income accruing to the wife after sharing. According to our
parameter estimates, a one dollar increase in the wife’s wage rate,
￿
￿ , (which is equivalent
to an annual increase of $1,740 (1988) in her labor income, at the mean of hours worked
by women) translates into more income being transferred to her husband. At sample mean,
the transfer amounts to $915 (or 52% of her annual income increase), although this effect
is not very precisely estimated. Also, a one dollar increase in the husband’s wage rate,
￿
G ,
22We did not use the same age group as the one used for couples (30-60) since doing this severely reduced the
sample size and made most coefﬁcients non signiﬁcant.
21(equivalent to an annual increase of $2,240 in his labor income) translates into more nonlabor
income being transferred to his wife. Indeed, the table shows that, at the mean of the sample,
$614 (or 27% of his income increase) will be transferred to his wife, but again this effect is
somewhat imprecisely estimated. These results lend support to the notion that there is some
formof altruism withincouples. The next lineindicatesthata one dollarincreasein household
nonlabor income will increase the wife’s income by 55 cents. Furthermore, a one percentage
point increase in the sex ratio index, according to our parameter estimates, induces husbands
to transfer an additional $2,562 of nonlabor income to their spouse.
Finally, the other columns of Table 5 report various labor supply elasticities. In general
these elasticities are comparable to those found in the empirical labor supply literature. At the
sample mean, women’s wage elasticities are positive and statistically signiﬁcant in both unre-
stricted and restricted versions (=0.152 and 0.145, resp.). Men’s wage elasticities are negative
but very small (=-0.013 and -0.016, resp.) and are not statistically signiﬁcant. Cross-wage
elasticities are all negative and not statistically signiﬁcant either. Moreover, both men’s and
women’slabor supplyelasticitieswith respectto nonlaborincomearenegativeand signiﬁcant.
The last two columns report the own-wage elasticities on after sharing individual labor
supplies (i.e., for a given
e
), as given by equations (11) and (12). These elasticities are ob-
tained from individual preferences alone since they ignore the effect of wage rates on the
intra-household decision process. Both women’s and men’s elasticities are smaller than their
counterpart reported in the previous columns. This simply reﬂects the fact that a marginal
increase in their wage rate reduces their share of the nonlabor income, which in turn increases
their labor supply through an income effect.
The setup of Tables 3 and 6 which focuses on households with no pre-school children
(1,197 observations) is similar to that of Tables 2 and 5. Note that nearly all the parameter
estimates of the upper panel of Table 3 are statistically signiﬁcant at conventional levels, ex-
cept for the coefﬁcients of the nonlabor income which are now less precise. As in the previous
case, the validity of instruments and of the over-identifying restrictions cannot be rejected on
thebasisof theusual
￿
+ tests. TheNewey-Westtest at thebottomof thetableindicatesthatthe
restriction imposed by the collective model is rejected at the 5% level but not rejected when
using a 1% level. As in the previous case, the sex ratio has a negative and statistically signif-
icant impact on women’s hours of work and a positive and statistically signiﬁcant impact on
men’s hours of work. Finally, the identiﬁableparametersof the sharing rule are all statistically
signiﬁcant at 10% or better.
Table 6 provides some interesting results concerning the impact of the presence of young
children. First, the impact of the sex ratio on women’s sharing rule considerably increases as
compared with the impact observed in the full sample (from $2,625 to $3,890). This suggests
22that women’s bargaining power is reduced when there are young children in the household,
perhaps because divorce is less credible when there are young children in the household.
Moreover, the results suggest that wives show more altruism towards their husband when
there are no children in the household. Indeed, the effect of an increase in wives’ wage rate on
transfers to their spouse markedly increases in households with no pre-school children. But
again the coefﬁcient is not very precisely estimated.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we provide evidence that the marriage market, as proxied by a sex ratio index,
inﬂuences household labor supplies. Our results thus reject one important prediction of the
unitary model accordingto which no distribution factor affects intra-household decisions. Our
results also contradict those Nash bargaining models that assume that the fall-back option is
internal to the household. Rather, we provide some support to Becker’s initial claim that the
state of the market for marriage should inﬂuence the intra-household decision process. More-
over, we develop a model which introduces distribution factors into the Chiappori’s (1992)
collective model of household labor supply, according to which the intra-household outcomes
are Pareto-efﬁcient. We show that the introduction of these factors, which include the sex
ratio, strongly simpliﬁes the way the model is identiﬁed. In addition, identiﬁcation appears to
be both more precise and more robust in the present context. Also, our results do not reject
the restrictions imposed by our model to the parameters of labor supply functions.
The parameters of the sharing rule associated with this model can be recovered, and turn
out to be signiﬁcantly different from zero. We ﬁnd that a one percentage point increase in the
proportion of males in the population induces husbands aged between 30 and 60 to increase
their transfer to their wife by $2,562 (1988) on average. This transfer is more important for
households with no pre-school children. Finally, our results suggest that spouses appear to
behave in an altruistic manner. For instance, a one dollar increase in a female’s wage rate
induces her to transfer close to 52% of her annual income increase to her spouse while the
corresponding ﬁgure, in the case of a husband, is a transfer of 27% to his wife.
Our analysis is subject to some limitations though. Since our estimates are conditional to
the choice of living in couple, they could suffer from a selection bias. In regions where the sex
ratio is relatively small, more “low-quality” men are likely to marry, given the scarcity of men
in the marriage market. As long as there is a positive correlation between quality in the mar-
riage market and in the labor market, this may create a spurious (positive) correlation between
the sex ratio and male hours of work. More research on collective models that endogenize
23both marital choices and labor supply is clearly needed.
Our approach assumes that the sex ratio is exogenous. However it could be viewed as a
variablethat adjustsacross regions to equilibratethe marriagemarkets[Becker (1991)]. While
we discuss some evidence that suggestthat this interpretation is not likelyto seriouslybias our
estimates, it would be important to provide an analysis of the factors that explain variations of
the sex ratio across regions. Another useful extension of our model would be to introduce a
variableof sexratioatthebeginningofmarriage. Aslongasmarriageagreementsarebinding,
this variable should be the relevant one to explain the intra-household distribution process and
labor supplybehavior. Finally,introducinghouseholdproductionin the modelwould be worth
considering [see Apps and Rees (1997) and Chiappori (1997) for a discussion].
24APPENDIX : Proof of Proposition 2

























































































































































































































These partials are compatible if and only if they satisfy the usual cross derivative restric-

















































































































































































If these equations are fulﬁlled, then
e








only on the preference factors










’ of Proposition 2 follow from
standard integrability arguments. Finally, the knowledge of Marshallian demands allows to








B Several distribution factors
Finally, if there are several distribution factors, then they can enter labor supply functions only
through the same function
e
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29TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
(Standard Deviation in Parentheses)
Full Sample Households with
No Preschool
Children
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
Endogenous Variables
Hours of Work (/1000) 1.74 2.24 1.78 2.24
(0.57) (0.64) (0.55) (0.65)
Log-wage 2.04 2.46 2.04 2.47
(0.68) (0.61) (0.67) (0.64)





￿ ) 0.26 –
(0.44) –
Children (7 – 17) 0.55 0.55
(0.49) (0.50)
Exogenous Variables
Age 37.7 40.6 39.6 42.3
(7.7) (7.8) (7.8) (7.9)
Schooling 5.2 5.2 5.1 5.2
(1.5) (1.6) (1.5) (1.7)






North East 0.18 0.19
North Central 0.24 0.23
West 0.15 0.15
Observations 1618 1197
Note: The schooling variables follow the 1989 coding.
Thus, for example, a value of 4 corresponds to 12 grades
and no further training, whereas a value of 5 corresponds
to 12 grades plus non academic training.TABLE 2
GMM PARAMETER ESTIMATES – FULL SAMPLE
HOURS/1000
Unrestricted Restricted Sharing
Version Version Rule of Wives








￿ 1.348 -0.671 1.019 -0.998 -63.923








G 0.813 -0.498 0.537 -0.771 -39.828


















G -0.439 0.230 -0.311 0.360 23.067
(0.123) (0.125) (0.135) (0.102) (10.640)
Nonlabor Income (/1000) -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 0.547
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.185)
Sex Ratio -2.767 5.020 -3.452 3.999 256.162
(0.985) (1.175) (0.894) (1.237) (93.461)
Intercept 1.501 0.715 2.638 2.011




￿ ) -0.659 0.172 -0.765 0.099
(0.207) (0.143) (0.201) (0.141)
Children (7–17) -0.154 0.093 -0.174 0.066
(0.070) (0.073) (0.069) (0.072)
Schooling -0.011 0.033 -0.007 0.033
(0.018) (0.012) (0.018) (0.012)
Age -0.131 0.077 -0.159 0.048
(0.047) (0.043) (0.045) (0.042)
White -0.019 -0.015 -0.008 0.006
(0.049) (0.051) (0.049) (0.053)
North East -0.180 -0.035 -0.169 -0.028
(0.037) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
North Central -0.037 0.010 -0.018 0.027
(0.040) (0.036) (0.040) (0.035)
West 0.041 -0.117 0.059 -0.101
(0.045) (0.041) (0.044) (0.040)
Value of Function 25.098 27.105
Newey-West Test 2.007
Notes:
1. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
2. Instruments: Second order polynomial in age and schooling (M-F), Father Ed-
ucation (M-F), White (M-F),Spanish (M-F), City size (3 dummies), North-East,
North-Central, West, Protestant (M-F), Jewish (M-F), Catholic (M-F), Sex ratio.
3. The parameters of the sharing rule are divided by 1,000.TABLE 3
GMM PARAMETER ESTIMATES
HOUSEHOLDS WITH NO PRESCHOOL CHILDREN
HOURS/1000
Unrestricted Restricted Sharing
Version Version Rule of Wives








￿ 2.145 -1.249 1.946 -1.605 -185.924








G 1.510 -0.841 1.345 -1.103 -131.708


















G -0.748 0.423 -0.667 0.564 65.292
(0.137) (0.137) (0.159) (0.128) (35.091)
Nonlabor Income (/1000) -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.004 0.489
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.274)
Sex Ratio -2.639 6.139 -3.973 3.358 389.052
(1.143) (1.359) (0.978) (1.321) (220.455)
Intercept -0.642 1.563 0.408 3.638
(0.760) (0.894) (0.864) (0.557)
Children (7–17) -0.190 -0.025 -0.185 -0.028
(0.064) (0.072) (0.063) (0.072)
Schooling -0.025 0.030 -0.026 0.026
(0.018) (0.014) (0.018) (0.014)
Age -0.069 0.031 -0.077 0.001
(0.021) (0.031) (0.021) (0.030)
White 0.088 -0.099 0.130 -0.014
(0.053) (0.061) (0.049) (0.062)
North East -0.229 -0.038 -0.231 -0.040
(0.042) (0.044) (0.042) (0.045)
North Central -0.104 0.033 -0.095 0.040
(0.041) (0.039) (0.042) (0.039)
West 0.007 -0.089 0.019 -0.076
(0.048) (0.046) (0.048) (0.046)
Value of Function 31.971 36.757
Newey-West Test 4.786
Notes:
1. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
2. Instruments: Second order polynomial in age and education (M-F), Father Ed-
ucation (M-F), White (M-F),Spanish (M-F), City size (3 dummies), North-East,
North-Central, West, Protestant (M-F), Jewish (M-F), Catholic (M-F)
3. The parameters of the sharing rule are divided by 1,000.TABLE 4
PARAMETER ESTIMATES – SINGLES
HOURS/1000
OLS GMM







￿ -0.039 -0.039 -0.335 0.167
(0.048) (0.047) (0.192) (0.205)
Nonlabor Income (/1000) -0.001 -0.0008 -0.0029 -0.002
(0.001) (0.0005) (0.0038) (0.002)
Intercept -0.346 1.139 -0.598 1.466
(1.241) (1.013) (1.302) (1.095)
Sex Ratio 4.039 1.294 5.043 0.439
(2.547) (2.029) (2.719) 2.167
Schooling 0.077 0.038 0.112 0.001
(0.020) (0.020) (0.030) (0.045)
Age 0.052 -0.013 0.102 -0.048
(0.038) (0.029) (0.058) (0.036)
White 0.129 0.177 0.210 0.212
(0.110) (0.089) (0.131) (0.107)
North East -0.078 -0.058 -0.039 -0.104
(0.103) (0.081) (0.110) (0.099)
North Central -0.204 -0.037 -0.211 0.018
(0.077) (0.075) (0.080) (0.078)
West -0.251 -0.163 -0.245 -0.153
(0.100) (0.092) (0.104) (0.112)
Value of Function 5.238 9.715
Number of Observations 572 498 572 498
Notes:
1. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses.
2. Instruments in GMM estimation: Second order polynomial
in age and education, Father Education, White, Spanish,
City size (3 dummies), North-East, North-Central, West,
Protestant, Jewish, Catholic, Sex ratio.T
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